Ana Palacio

Syria is a blood-soaked shambles. Four years of civil war have left more than 200,000 dead, 1 million wounded and 6.7 million people internally displaced. Another 3.8 million are living as refugees outside the country, and 13 million (out of a prewar population of 20 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance. Two illustrious United Nations special envoys – Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi – have resigned in the face of Syria’s self-perpetuating spiral of violence.

But against this bleak background, there is reason for cautious optimism. Kurdish forces recently succeeded, after months of heavy fighting, in expelling ISIS from the border town of Ain al-Arab, also known as Kobani. Moreover, the new U.N. envoy, Staffan de Mistura, has initiated a pragmatic and determined “Aleppo first” strategy, which aims to freeze military operations in the shattered city and facilitate the entry of aid. Could this mark a turning point for Syria?

When the crisis in Syria erupted, nobody predicted how serious, protracted and complex it would turn out to be. For starters, observers underestimated citizens’ ever-deepening sense of hopelessness, which has driven them to support jihadi groups or the Assad regime.

The conflict is also unique in its asymmetry, stemming from the numerous and disparate actors involved. There are only two conventional armies: the Kurdish fighters and the forces loyal to President Bashar Assad. The opposition comprises factions dependent on foreign sponsors. Indeed, the “nationalist” opposition is merely an assortment of factions responsible for protecting small territories, and the Free Syrian Army is little more than a fantasy. The stark reality is that the best-organized groups are the jihadis: ISIS, the Nusra Front and the Islamic Front.

De Mistura’s plan aims to stabilize the situation by shifting the policy focus away from a relentless military campaign – an approach that is benefiting only ISIS. The plan’s emphasis on Aleppo– which is not only a commercial hub and Syria’s largest city, but also represents a sort of microcosm of the country – distinguishes it from the shaky cease-fires that have been implemented in Homs and elsewhere in the country.

The strategy’s main strength is that it is not, in itself, a peace project. Instead of requiring that any or all factions surrender or relinquish their weapons, it calls only for the cessation of heavy fighting, to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and prevent Aleppo’s total collapse.

Such a freeze – guaranteed by an effective enforcement mechanism – would present an important opportunity to make progress in confidence-building. Recent talks in Cairo and Moscow produced small, but not negligible, steps in that direction. The objective should be to initiate a productive dialogue – and, ultimately, achieve consensus – among relevant actors.

In this proxy war, no solution will be possible without the agreement of the factions’ main sources of support – Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Likewise, Turkey must not only address the inflow of refugees, security concerns along its border with Syria, and its position as a transit country for jihadis; it must also develop a coherent policy toward ISIS that is not subsumed in official anxiety over demands by the country’s Kurdish minority.

Other powers will also have a key role to play. Support by the United States for de Mistura’s initiative symbolizes a quiet – and constructive – shift by President Barack Obama’s administration from its demand that Assad step down immediately.

The European Union’s policy toward Syria, however, remains muddled, with member states having managed to agree only to create a “regional trust fund” to address the crisis. Given the EU’s strong interest in a more stable Syria, rooted in its geographical proximity, it is time for European leaders to take an unequivocal stance on Syria.

But a lasting solution to the conflict ultimately comes down to the Syrians. In fact, the foundations for the kind of Syrian-led political solution that is needed were laid with the 2012 Geneva I Communiqué. At that time, successive rounds of negotiations failed, owing to an all-or-nothing mentality, based largely on the mistaken assumption that Assad, like Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, would be ousted relatively quickly. But de Mistura has made it clear that he aims neither to build a lasting peace with Assad nor to establish Assad’s departure from power as a precondition for peace. The solution lies between these two options, and the West – especially Europe – must accept that.

Placing unrealistic demands on a Syrian peace process is a sure route to failure. Pragmatism is essential, even if it means that some relevant actors, including the EU, have to swallow their pride. The stability of the region and the lives (and what is left of the livelihoods) of the Syrian people depend on it.