Sometimes March 14 leaders overdo tactics and almost neglect strategy. Here are three examples:

The first is the conflict with Israel. Now that March 14 is seeking to embarrass Hezbollah in a domestic struggle, it is praising resistance against Israel and the aiming of weapons at Israel rather than the Lebanese interior. I think that this rhetoric is poorly thought out in the long-term. I say this not out of any love for Israel, but out of love for Lebanon. The problem is this: resistance or no resistance. Resistance always begins as a struggle with Israel and always ends as an internal problem. This is what happened with the Palestinian resistance, and it has happened again with Hezbollah’s resistance.

Will the current problem actually be solved if Hezbollah turns its weapons toward Lebanon’s borders? This will still necessarily affect the domestic situation, due to Israeli retaliation and the Resistance’s need for support bases behind the borders, not to mention other reasons.

Honesty and frankness require us to say this: Yes, we have problems with Israel, but they can be solved through political and diplomatic means. A solution is possible via ties between the international community and a Lebanese state that is respected and has credibility. As for resistance, it is not for us because we do not have the prerequisites. The problems of the period following Israel’s 2000 withdrawal can be overcome without resorting to resistance. Moreover, resistance exacerbates our internal fears of one other and further weakens our already fragile national fabric.

The second issue is Arabism. Lebanon must always be an active country at the level of inter-Arab relations.

However, it is not permissible that, in order to prove Hezbollah’s “Persianism” (and this is in any case a racist label), we resort to virtually Baathist bragging about Arabism. If it is intuitively obvious that Lebanon is linked to the Arab world, it is also well known that the concept of Arabism is extremely confused and ambiguous. This has had bitter ramifications for the Lebanese situation. There is the cultural Arabism that originally grew in Mount Lebanon toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth. There is also the political Arabism that raised its flags with the Baath in Syria, then with Nasser in Egypt. Although the first was a national Lebanese demand and need, the second was a concept of trans-border ties that eroded national sovereignty. It is likely that this is neither intended nor desired.

The third issue is the Shia. It is true that Hezbollah’s weapons are the action that causes a reaction. Since the party is Shia, it is logical that the reaction to it comes in the same sectarian mold.

However, overreliance on tactics often leads to a kind of permissiveness toward sectarian reactions to sectarian action. This permissiveness, in this case, “intensifies zeal” that is desired by some in order to confront Hezbollah and balance out its power. However, this ought to be abandoned in favor of a clearer and more precise distinction, not just limited to media occasions, between the Shia and Hezbollah.
This distinction is urgently required for nation building, not just for the struggle with Hezbollah, but for our future.