By Ali Ezzatyar 

In February 2011, when the Egyptian military helped oust President Hosni Mubarak, it was natural to think of the applicability of the Turkish precedent to Egypt. This precedent was not lost on the Muslim Brotherhood, either. One of former President Mohammad Mursi’s goals was to take power out of the hands of the military, as the Turkish government appears to have done. But it took a long line of Turkish Islamists, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the coup de grace, to bring this situation about. If Egypt is to be any different, Egyptians should be wary of finding solace in its longest lasting autocratic institution.

 

Regardless of one’s opinion on the recent dismissal of Mursi, Egypt’s military did not ultimately respect its promise to hand over power to a civilian leadership after a transition. After just one year, it has annulled the civilian government, while its subsequent plans have left many who were excited about Mursi’s exit concerned.

 

In Turkey, as in Egypt, popular discontent precipitated four military coup d’etats in less than 40 years, from 1960 to 1997. Much of this discontent, even as early as the first coup, was the result of tensions surrounding religion and its role in society and government.

 

In 1960, the ruling Democratic Party in Turkey began to loosen anti-religious legislation, allowing thousands of mosques to reopen and reinstituting the call to prayer in Arabic. In 1997, Erdogan’s previous party, the Islamist Welfare Party was removed after it raised similar tensions when it acceded to power. In all cases, the military stepped in when the opposition was at its most defiant.

 

Similar to Egypt, the Turkish military switched from antagonist to protagonist depending on the economic situation and the popularity of the ruling party. In times of relative stability and democratic unity, the military was made a villain. In weaker economic periods, with a divided polity, the military was popular. Societal tensions led to popular discontent that gave the military critical support to annul the democratic process. Does this sound familiar?

 

How could an all-powerful military have been sidelined by civilians in Turkey? While the military removed Turkish governments, a relatively free civil society otherwise remained. The crucial factor in tipping the balance of power away from the military was the ability of Turkey’s Islamists to engage in a grassroots effort to control the institutions that had rubber stamped the military coups, namely the judiciary and the police, while also infiltrating the military itself.

 

Much of this is to the credit of the grassroots movement of Fethullah Gulen. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while professing allegiance to Turkey’s secular values, his movement promoted its platform through financial contributions from the lower middle class, ultimately begetting a circle of nepotism that landed Gulenists in prominent positions of government. When the ruling Justice and Development Party won elections in 2002, it was not the first time that Islamists had taken power through the ballot box. But this time, they had important institutions squarely on their side.

 

Contrast this with Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, while active in society, did not function in the context of a civil society that allowed them to contribute to lasting institutions. They could garner votes, but there was little chance of the Brotherhood withstanding a power struggle with the military. The popularity of the Brotherhood would have accelerated their ascent to power in key institutions, but Egypt’s institutions were far too weak to sustain themselves as a counterweight to the oldest and most powerful institution of them all.

 

Turkey is by no means a flawless democracy today. But in comparison to Egypt, as the last few months have shown, it is an evolved and sophisticated one. In contrast, in Egypt traditionally strong civil society institutions such as the Egyptian Bar Association, have only deteriorated since the 2011 revolution, not the contrary.

 

So where does this leave democracy in Egypt today? Are growing pains necessary while Egypt’s civil society strengthens? Egyptians, like the Turks of the 1960s-’90s, aspire to stability. They also believe that the military is the most capable of providing that stability in times of chaos. But long-term stability and growth, as Turkey has demonstrated, is only possible with civilian democratic leadership.

 

Military rule is undemocratic and doesn’t bring growth. As Turks have learned, until Egyptians value democracy enough to accept the short-term decisions taken by a popular majority, stability and democracy will evade them. Egyptians must pressure future civilian governments and refuse military intervention, or they could find themselves in the early stages of a process of successive coups as in Turkey.