The following narrative is based on Naame Shaam's 2014 report Iran in Syria: From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force (henceforth 'the Report').
The Report is the result of a year of Naame Shaam’s work. It draws largely on information gathered from monitoring Syrian, Iranian and the international media’s coverage of events in Syria. The majority of the information and sources found in the Report are thus in the public domain. What we did is 'connect dispersed pixels' to create a clear, meaningful image and use it as a basis for the new narrative and policy recommendations below.
1. Sepah Pasdaran and Hezbollah are fighting and directing all major battles in Syria
It is no longer accurate to describe the war in Syria as a 'conflict' between Syrian rebels on the one hand and Bashar al-Assad's regime forces 'supported' by Sepah Pasdaran (the Iranian Revolutionary Guards), Hezbollah Lebanon and Iraqi militias on the other.
All major, strategic battles in Syria – along the frontlines of regime-held areas – are now being fought and directed by Sepah Pasdaran and Hezbollah Lebanon, rather than the al-Assad forces.
The Iranian regime's military involvement in the ongoing war in Syria has gradually grown from providing strategic and technical support to being in overall control of the Syrian regime's military strategy and directing all its major military campaigns.
2. The Iranian regime is propping up the Syrian regime's economy
The Iranian regime has been spending billions of dollars on weapons and fighters shipped to Syria since the start of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, as well as financing a big part of the economy in the regime-controlled parts of Syria through financial loans and credit lines worth billions of dollars.
The al-Assad regime would have collapsed a long time ago if it was not for this Iranian support.
3. The Iranian regime is complicit in serious crimes in Syria
There have been numerous reports by various international bodies and organizations, including the UN, on war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Syrian regime forces and militias. But most of these reports stop short of pointing the finger at everyone responsible for these crimes.
Naame Shaam's report provides many examples of human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Syria that would not have taken place without the Iranian regime's direct military involvement.
There is sufficient evidence to start investigations and even bring lawsuits against the Iranian regime's military and political leadership for complicity in many of these crimes at various levels, ranging from 'inciting' and 'endorsing and adopting' criminal and terrorist specific acts to 'aiding and abetting' war crimes and crimes against humanity.
4. Syria is partly under Iranian military occupation
The massive military and economic support provided by the Iranian regime to Bashar al-Assad's regime has led to a de facto military occupation by the Iranian regime of regime-held areas in Syria. These areas are under the total control of Sepah Pasdaran and their foot soldiers like Hezbollah Lebanon.
The chief of Sepah Qods, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, and a few other commanders from Sepah Pasdaran are today the de facto rulers of 'Iranian-occupied Syria'. Bashar al-Assad and his regime are little more than puppets in their hands.
This reality has political as well as legal implications. The Report details legal arguments for treating the war in Syria as an international conflict that involves a foreign military occupation by the Iranian regime and its militias and a liberation struggle by Syrian people against this foreign occupation, as defined by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
Recognizing the war in Syria as an international conflict also means that, as an occupying force, Iran has certain 'duties' towards the Syrian population under its occupation, according to the Fourth Geneva Convention.
There is sufficient evidence that the Iranian regime and its various forces and militias fighting in Syria have repeatedly violated many of these duties since March 2011. These violations are considered even more serious war crimes than those outlined above.
5. The policy of the US and its allies of 'slowly bleeding' Iran and Hezbollah in Syria
The Report examines and assesses the 'slow bleeding' policy adopted by the US and its allies towards Iran and Hezbollah in Syria. The rationale behind the policy appears to be an assumption that a prolonged proxy war with the Iranian regime in Syria, coupled with crippling economic sanctions and falling oil prices, would eventually lead to weakening the Iranian regime and therefore force it to agree to scrap its military nuclear programme and end its destabilizing policies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere
Some even hope that all the above mentioned factors would lead to the weakening and even collapse of the Iranian regime ('winning the Syria war in the streets of Tehran'). This is, at best, wishful thinking. Similar things were said about the Syrian regime at the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Like their counterparts in Syria, Sepah Pasdaran and the Basij have shown that they can, and will, ruthlessly crush any internal dissent, and that they can 'bleed' for much longer, so to speak.
Moreover, the 'slow bleeding' policyis being implemented at the disproportionate expense of the people of Syria and the wider region, and is leading to more instability and extremism in the Middle East and beyond.
6. The US national and regional interests
The ‘slowly bleeding’ policy and the US administration’s refusal to provide serious support to the moderate Syrian rebels has led to the strengthening of extremist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS or ISIL) and other Qaeda-linked groups like Jabhat al-Nusra.
A serious confrontation between the West and the Iranian regime, whether political or military, is only being postponed, while on the ground people are dying, being displaced in their millions, or joining extremist groups. This is not only a tragedy for the people of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq; it is also a serious threat to regional and international security.
Furthermore:
- It is not in the US interest that the prevailing perception among many Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis now is that they are being left to die or left at the mercy of the sectarian, Iranian-controlled regimes of Syria and Iraq, while the West is focusing on fighting ISIS. - It is not in the US interest that the moderate Syrian opposition is becoming weaker and weaker and may eventually be defeated because toppling the Assad regime is 'not a priority right now'. - It is not in the US interest that the Iranian regime is left to consolidate its dominance in the region through its well-equipped and ideologically motivated Shia militias that are as dangerous as ISIS.
7. The Iranian regime and the war on ISIS
The Report documents the relationship between the Syrian and the Iranian regimes on one hand and ISIS and other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups on the other. The Report concludes that both the Syrian and the Iranian regimes have infiltrated, collaborated and used these terrorist groups to derail the Syrian revolution towards militarization and sectarianism and to justify their military actions against Syrian protesters and rebels.
This is significant as both regimes are now attempting to sell themselves as 'partners' in the international campaign against Islamist terrorist groups, following the UN Security Council resolution on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in August 2014 and the US President's declaration of war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in September 2014.
Neither of these decisions explicitly mentioned the links of these groups with the Iranian and Syrian regimes.
Today, moderate Syrian rebels are at the same time fighting: - against the al-Assad regime and various foreign forces and militias (Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Sepah Pasdaran) that are fighting alongside and on behalf of the regime; and - against extremist groups such as ISIS.
Limiting the support provided to Syrian rebels to one of these fronts (fighting ISIS) is not working and is not sustainable in the long term.
Refusing to work with existing moderate Syrian armed forces and not targeting the Assad regime and other Iranian-backed militias and forces fighting in Syria will only lead to weakening moderate Syrian rebels and to their eventual defeat.
The gap will most certainly be filled by extremist forces and militias, both Sunni and Shia. The heavy losses suffered by the Free Syrian Army against Iranian-backed forces, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo, Idlib and elsewhere in Syria in October-November 2014 are but one example of this inevitable scenario.
8. Saving the al-Assad regime at any cost to keep arms flowing to Hezbollah
The Iranian regime's adventure in Syria is not just about saving Bashar al-Assad and his regime.
The Iranian intervention is Syria has been driven first and foremost by its own strategic interests.
At the forefront of these interests is keeping arms shipments flowing to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, so as to keep Hezbollah a strong deterrent against any attack on Iran's military nuclear programme.
The Iranian regime's influence in Syria is likely to continue even after the fall of the Assad regime because it is now exercised primarily through Iranian-backed and controlled militias fighting in Syria on behalf of the Syrian regime.
Many of these militias, both local and foreign, are likely to outlive Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle and will try to continue exerting influence on the ground and serve the Iranian regime's interests, i.e. securing arms shipments to Hezbollah via Syria.
Background: Following the Hezbollah-Israel war in the summer of 2006, marine vessels under a UN mandate have been preventing Iranian arms reaching Hezbollah via Lebanese ports (in line with UN Security Council resolution 1701, 11 August 2006). Since then, the Iranian regime has been sending heavy arms and ammunition to Hezbollah Lebanon via Syrian ports. From there they are illegally transported into Lebanon. Syria has been the lifeline of Iran’s army in Lebanon, Hezbollah, since 2006.
9. Iranian ‘lines of defense’ to protect Iran's military nuclear facilities
Negotiators at the Iran nuclear talks in New York, Geneva and Vienna have been consistently refusing to also talk about the Iranian regime's intervention in Syria and Iraq, insisting on keeping this as 'a separate file'. But the two issues are not separate for intrinsic reasons.
The main reason for the Iranian regime's uncompromising determination to save Bashar al-Assad's regime at any cost is to maintain its ability to ship arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, so as to keep Hezbollah a strong deterrent against any possible Israeli and/or Western attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities.
Other ‘lines of defense’ are the Iranian-supported Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip (along Israel’s southern border) and the Iranian-supported Huthi Shia militia in Yemen (along the southern border of the second-most important Western ally in the region, Saudi Arabia).
If the al-Assad regime falls, Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah are likely to stop and Hezbollah would no longer be the threatening deterrence against Israel that it is now. The Iranian regime would therefore feel more vulnerable and would not be able to negotiate from a strong position during nuclear talks with the E3+3 powers, as it is doing now. It may even have to give up its nuclear dreams for a while. All available resources in Iran (human, economic, military) have been mobilized to achieve this strategic aim.
Hezbollah is Sepah Pasdaran in Lebanon and the Iranian involvement in Lebanon and in Syria is mainly about deterrence and creating the best possible situation for the Iranian regime to be able to build its nuclear bomb one day in order to guarantee its survival. The Iranian regime, represented by Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Sepah Pasdaran, will not give up this dream easily, if ever.
Thus, agreeing to lift the sanctions on Iran for the sake of minor, temporary concessions from the Iranian regime about its nuclear programme, and without any serious commitment to end its intervention in Syria – as well as Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen – is effectively giving it a green light to carry on with its policies in these countries. It is also buying the Iranian regime time to consolidate its hegemony in the region.
The US and the EU have a moral as well as a political obligation to stop the bloodbath in Syria and to stabilize Iraq and Lebanon as soon as possible. Without direct military intervention, one effective way to do this is by linking the Iran nuclear talks and sanctions to the Iranian regime's intervention in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
This is the only realistic opportunity at the moment to push for and impose a fundamental shift in Iran's foreign policy. Not doing so will understandably be seen by people in the region as the West's trading Syria, Iraq and Lebanon for the Iranian nuclear bomb.
While no one should be against improving the economic relations between Iran and any other country, one cannot ignore the fact that a big part of the subsequent economic gains under the current conditions will be wasted on enabling human rights abuses in Iran as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria and elsewhere.
10. US denial about the situation in Syria to avoid direct confrontation with Iran
The US and its allies are yet to admit that their war in Syria and Iraq is a proxy war primarily against the Iranian regime. This is presumably because they do not want to be pressured into a direct confrontation with the Iranian regime by taking quick and concrete steps to end the bloodshed in Syria and Iraq and to stabilize Lebanon.
The US administration has so far been unwilling to intervene in Syria in any decisive manner against the Assad regime, Sepah Pasdaran and Hezbollah. The policy of 'slowly bleeding Iran and Hezbollah in Syria' (see above) has been translated as giving Syrian rebels just enough support not to lose the war, but not enough to win either.
The US decision in September 2014 to support the Syrian opposition is limited to fighting the extremists of ISIS. There is no mention of Sepah Pasdaran and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, moderate rebels are still waiting for the promised support to materialize.
The consequences of this policy for Syria and the Syrian people have been catastrophic.
Liaising or collaborating with the Iranian regime in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, whether tacitly or openly, will understandably antagonize the Sunni majority in the region.
More and more Sunnis in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and elsewhere are supporting ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and joining their ranks, not necessarily because they believe in these groups' ideologies, but because of the years-long oppression and marginalization that they have suffered at the hands of the Iranian-backed Shia army and militias in Iraq and the Iranian-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Perceptions that the US and its allies are 'not interested' in stopping or challenging the growing sectarian dominance of the Iranian regime in the region will only increase the popularity of groups like ISIS and make their defeat more difficult, if not impossible. This cannot be in the interest of the US and its allies.
Notes:
The report's Executive Summary is available in Persian at:
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